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who has custody of the dead body not as the owner but merely as
a trustee who holds it in trust for the benefit of those who may have
an interest in the corpse.3"
Thomas McKendree Chattin, Jr.

Statutory Construction-The Role of the Court
"If there is no meaning in it,
that saves a world of trouble,
know, as we needn't try to
you
find any."
Alice in Wonderland

The 1964 Civil Rights Act includes within its purview the
words "place of . . . entertainment" which "customarily presents
. ..entertainment which move(s) in commerce."' When a mother
and her two children were turned away from defendant's amusement
park because of their race, the question arose whether the defendant
corporation fell within the coverage of the Act. The lower court
and the dissenting opinion given in the circuit court, employing the
rule of ejusdem generis, construed "entertainment" as used in the
Act to mean only exhibitive entertainment, not participative, and
held that the defendant, offering only participative amusements,
was not within the Act. Moreover, they emphasized the requirement that the "entertainment ... moves in commerce," holding that
permanently placed mechanical rides do not so "move."
The majority, however, held that the defendant corporation came
within both the letter and the spirit of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
In reaching this conclusion, they found among other things: that
"entertainment" as used in the Act included both exhibitive and
participative activities; that because the park was located on a
major highway and no geographical restrictions were placed on its
radio and television advertisements, its patrons move in commerce
to the extent required by the Act; and finally, after looking at the
purpose behind the statute, that this decision complied with the
spirit of the law.'
32 Teasley v. Thompson, 204 Ark. 959, 165 S.E.2d 940 (1942). See
Sherrard v. Henry, 88 W. Va. 315, 106 S.E. 705 (1921), which held that
survivors had a right to the possession of the body and also have a right to
make final disposition; however, it stated that they are under an obligation to
make the disposition "properly."
ICivil Rights Act of 1964, § 201 (b)(3) and (c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §
2000 a (b)(3) and (c)(3).
2 Miller v.Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1969

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3 [1969], Art. 17
1969]

STUDENT NOTES

These two conflicting views on statutory construction illustrate
an as yet unsolved problem in American jurisprudence-the lack of
agreement on what role the courts should play in interpreting
statutes.
Legislation is of necessity abstract and general. Obviously, then,
cases requiring statutory construction arise in which the particular
factual situation is not expressly covered by the statute. This may
occur because the terms used in the statute are so broad, their
applicability to any given situation is shrouded in vagueness or
because the factual situation is one never conceived of by the
legislature. The contending parties will present two very plausible,
yet contradictory interpretations. What should the court's function
be in these situations? Is the gap between the statute and the
particular factual situation to be filled by the legislature or by the
court acting in place of the legislature as it thinks the legislature
would act? Should the court act according to its own judgment
without regard to how it thinks the legislature would act? How a
judge answers this question reflects his philosophy of the judicial
function. As there have been different viewpoints of the court's
role in this situation, the approaches to the problem have varied.
According to Pound, statutes in general may be accepted by the
courts in one of four ways.3 Regardless of the category adopted,
the interpretation of a statute involves, as a preliminary process, a
search for the meaning of the word or words in question. This can
be exploted on three levels. First, the ordinary meaning of the
word is sought-the usual source being the dictionary. Secondly,
the context in which the word is found is probed-the relation of the
word to other words in the statute. From this second consideration
have come three rules of construction:
A. "noscitur a sociis"-a general word takes color from the
preceding specific words with which it is attached.
3Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 385-86

(1908). The four possibilities are:
(1) Receive it completely into the law, accord it greater value than
earlier case-law on the subject, and reason by analogy from it.
(2) Receive it completely into the law, analogize from it, yet hold it
equal to case-law.
(3) Do not receive it completely into the law, do not analogize from
it, but construe its provisions liberally.
(4) Do not receive it completely into the law, do not analogize from it,
and construe its provisions very narrowly.
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B. "ejusdem generis"--a general phrase takes color from preceding specific words or phrases.
C. "expressio unius, exclusio alterius"-a general phrase takes
words or phrases following it as well as
color from the specific
4
those preceding it.
The third method of establishing the meaning of words within
the statute is in relation to the subject matter-that is, finding
the meaning of a word in relation to the background of that part
of human conduct with which the act deals.'
These considerations, however, deal only with the textual material
of the statute; they do not per se establish how the statute is to be
construed. Thus, new considerations must be examined, and the
court may choose which to invoke on the basis of whether it adopts
a strict or liberal view of statutory interpretation.
Perhaps the most famous quote dealing with the subject of judicial
construction of statutes is one attributed to a sermon by Bishop
Hoadley:
Nay, whosoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any
written or spoke laws, it is he who is truly the Law-giver to all
intents and purposes and not the person who first wrote or spoke
them6

In possible deference to such an admonition, courts using the
strictest of constructions will invoke the "plain-meaning" rule. If
the words in question are plain and unambiguous, the courts will
give them their ordinary meaning even if this results in absurdity
or injustice in the particular case.' A step up from this guideline is
one called the "golden rule." Here again, words are given their
ordinary meaning, but there is one exception-if the result would
be an absurdity, the words may be modified, but only for that
particular situation.8
4

Although these three rules are obvious propositions, they are still used
by courts today to justify decisions as is evidenced by the lower court's
reliance on ejusdem generis in the Miller case. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1958).
65 Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell, 16 CAN. BAR REv. 1 (1938).
Quoted in J. GRAY, NATuRE AND SoURcES OF THE LAW, 102, 125, 172
(2nd ed. 1921).
7 Willis, supra note 5, at 10.
8
1d. at 12. Neither of these approaches is particularly helpful-where
words in a statute are that unambiguous, their construction will not ordinarily
be called for. Moreover, what actually is plain-meaning and what is an
absurdity within the laws? Such nebulous terms are of little aid in attempting
to set out clear-cut standards of statutory construction.
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Statutory construction is commonly thought to be necessary when
"there is a fair contest between two readings, neither of which
comes without respectable title deeds." 9 In such a situation, more
than a reading of the text is required. Justice Frankfurter described
the most troublesome area of statutory construction as "the extent
to which extraneous documentation and external circumstances may
be allowed to infiltrate the text on the theory that they were part of
it, written in ink discernible to the judicial eye."' ° Thus the
question becomes: what other evidence will the court consider in
addition to the words of the statute itself? Frankfurter maintained
that the purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain meaning;
thus, any extrinsic evidence that is considered is to be devoted solely
to that end. Furthermore, the meaning sought is of the "words used
by the legislature. To go beyond [that] is to usurp a power which
our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature."" He contended
that to permit the courts to employ a loose standard of statutory construction would take pressure off the legislature to responsibly
discharge its duty.' 2
Justice Holmes stressed finding the general purpose of a statute
as "a more important aid to meaning than any rule which grammar
or formal logic may lay down."'" Thus the search is for the
general purpose or legislative intent behind the statute. Such a
construction is referred to as the "mischief rule." In interpreting a
statute, four things are to be considered:
1. What was the common law rule before the statute was passed?
2. What mischief or defect was not provided for by the common
law? 3. What remedy has the legislation offered to cure that
defect? 4. What reason lies behind such a remedy? 4
Under this rule, a statute may not be interpreted until the court
knows what social policy it encompasses. Only after discovering why
the act was passed can the court interpret the words of the statute
so as to give effect to the underlying social policy established by the
legislature.'5
9 Frankfurter, Some Reflections On The Reading Of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. Rnv. 527, 527-28 (1947).
'Old. at 529.
" Id. at 533.
121d. at 545.
,3 United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905).
,4 Heydon's Case, 3 Co. 7b (1584).
15 Willis, supra note 5, at 14.
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Unless, as is rarely the case, the legislature spells out its purpose
within the act itself, the search for intent will focus on the legislative
history of the statute.
The "search for the legislative intent" approach has been strongly
criticized. One writer has maintained that legislative intent is nearly
impossible to find and, even if discovered, would not be binding.'"
The issue being litigated cannot exist until the statute has been
passed. "To say that the intent of the legislature decides the
interpretation is to say that the legislature interprets in advance by
undertaking the impossibility of examining a determinable to see
whether it can cover a situation which does not exist"'" On the
other hand, it was argued fairly recently that statements by those
who helped in drafting a statute, whether or not they are legislators,
should be considered as indicative of the aim of the statute.'"
However, there is some danger here that too much significance could
be attached to a casual or tentative statement that was not meant
to be an explanation of policy; moreover, legislators do not always
reveal the intent behind a statute for fear it will imperil passage.' 9
It has been further argued that in cases involving factual situations
never conceived of by the legislature when it passed the statute,
the court does not really decide the issue of legislative intent.
Rather, the judge steps into the shoes of the legislative and attempts
to predict what that body would have done had this particular
question come before it.20
The need to reply on legislative intent as a justification for court
interpretation of statutes, particularly in cases where no clear
legislative policy is discernible, seems to result from a judicial fear
Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARv. L. REV. 863 (1930).

16

Id. at 871-72. In reply to this criticism, another writer maintained that
through records of legislative assemblies, and studies of legislative history,
including the political and economic forces at work at the time of passage,
legislative intent could be discovered. Moreover, the author decried strong
judges who override legislative intent to make the law conform to their
personal views and judges, who, to keep from admitting that they are
legislating, speak of legislative intent in a statute where none is discoverable.
Landis, A Note On "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REv. 886 (1930).
'7

18 Statutory Construction-Legislative Intent-Use Of Extrinsic Aids In
Wisconsin, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 660.
19 Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the

Court Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535 (1948). On the wisdom of referring to legislative
intent, Justice Jackson stated: "I am coming to think it is a badly overdone
practice, of dubious help to true interpretation and one which poses
serious practical problems for a large part of the legal profession." Id. at
537-38.
20

J. GRAY, THE NATURE An SouacEs OF LAw 170-71 (2nd ed. 1921),
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of usurping legislative prerogatives.

However, Holmes, Hughes,

Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo, Frankfurter, Douglas and Jackson,
among others, have maintained that in the absence of a statute,
judicial legislation is an inherent part of the judicial function."
"There has, however, been greater reluctance to admit that, similarly,
interpretation of statutes often requires such legislation. Yet it is
difficult to justify such a differentation." 22
Justice Cardozo noted the similarities between legislators and
judges, observing also the limits placed on judges engaged in
"legislating" decisions:
The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in
the end be guided by like considerations for the one as for
the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his
competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower.
He legislates only between the gaps. He fills the open spaces in
the law. . . Even within the gaps, restrictions not easy to
define . . . hedge and circumscribe his action. . . . None the

less, within the confines of these open spaces and those of
precedent and tradition, choice moves with a freedom which
23
stamps its act as creative.
One other consideration has received attention in the attempt to
delineate the judicial role in statutory construction. It is that since
statutes vary, the methods for interpreting them should also vary.
This idea has been implemented in two ways: looking at each
statute individually to determine what rules of construction should
be applied to it24 and creating presumptions of strict or liberal
21 Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 621 n.38 (2nd Cir. 1944).
22 Judge Frank adds that limitations inherent in legislation
"frequently compels the courts, as best they can, to fill in the gaps,
an activity which, no matter how one may label it, is in part legislative.
Sagacious legal scholars of high repute . . . have said that courts, in
discharging their duty of carrying out the express will of the legislature
as faithfully as they can, are frequently unable to escape the responsibility of engaging in supplemental legislation. Id. at 621.
23 B. CARDozo, Ta- NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 113-15 (1921).
Justice Cardozo further differentiated the roles by pointing out that the
legislator deals abstractly with a general situation with few limitations; the
judge, on the other hand deals with particular cases and concrete problems.
Thus the judge must maintain his objectivity, ridding himself of any personal
influences
with the case. Id. at 120.
24
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on The Reading of Statutes, 47 COLJM.
L. REv. 527, 537 (1947):
And so, the significance of an enactment, its antecedents as well as
its later history, its relation to other enactments, all may be relevant to
the construction of words for one purpose and in one setting but not
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interpretation for certain classes of cases.25
Thus, courts have run the gamut between strict and liberal constructions of statutes-no set standard has emerged and the area has
indeed been a muddled one. Perhaps the answer lies in establishing
that courts have a greater discretion, than is often thought, to
interpret statutes in light of the social policies sought to be effected
by the legislation. As the law increases in size and complexity,
it seems reasonable to allow the courts an active part, along with
the legislature, in implementing policy-rather than to shackle
courts to the narrow duty of interpreting literal meanings.
It is arguable that whenever the construction of a statute is in
doubt, the judge becomes a law-maker, as opposed to a mere lawfinder. When the applicability of a statute is questioned, what in
effect is being said is that the statute does not answer the judge's
final question-what should he do with this particular factual
situation? The answers the statute does give, however, may be close
enough to the one sought-if they involve the same social goalsso as to provide the method for ascertaining that answer also. The
court, by looking at the purposes behind the answers given, can
formulate from these purposes the answer to the particular problem.
In doing this, the court would not be confined to other statutes but
would employ constitutions, judicial decisions, customs, etc.
When they are considered it becomes clear that the judicial
task in the interpretation of statutes entails the same freedom
and the same limitations as do the problems of the Constitution
and of the Common Law. Authoritative answers in all of these
cases are rarely in point; the resort must be to reason and judgment.2"
Linda L. Hupp
for another. Some words are confined to their history; some are starting
points for history. Words are intellectual and moral currency. They
come from the legislative mint with some intrinsic meaning. Sometimes
it remains unchanged. Like currency, words sometimes appreciate or
depreciate in value.
25 Some of these presumptions are not used today to the extent that they
have been in the past; however, a few examples of the presumptions are:
1. the presumption against taking away a common law right;
2. presumption against taking away property without compensation;
3. presumption against barring a person from the courts;
4. presumption against interfering with the personal liberty of the
individual;
5. penal statutes given a strict interpretation.
26
Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay In Statutory Interpretation, 38
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1965).
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